




This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 3.0 United States License.  
 
This site is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as 
part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program, and is cosponsored by the University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) 
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.67 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
Dr. Lin Lin 
 
Journal of Law & Commerce
  
Vol. 32, No. 2 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.67 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
 
207 
REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA: 
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
Dr. Lin Lin∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Executive compensation is an essential element of a corporate 
governance system and an issue of public concern and academic debate. 
However, the existing literature on executive compensation has primarily 
focused on the United States, United Kingdom and continental European 
jurisdictions. This paper presents a comprehensive comparative study of the 
law and practices of executive pay in China. It critically examines the 
processes that produce compensation arrangements, as well as the various 
legal strategies and market forces that act on these processes in the context 
of China. 
Based on extensive empirical evidence, it finds that excessive pay in 
China is less prevalent than that in the United States. Nevertheless, Chinese 
executive compensation is not optimal in that there are both excessive 
executive pay and low levels of equity incentives for executives in Chinese 
listed companies. Meanwhile, executives of state-owned enterprises are 
largely compensated by on-duty consumption, grey income and political 
reward. 
The article argues that the fundamental problem of executive pay in 
Chinese listed companies lies in the internal defects of its unique 
governance institutions, as well as the prevalence of concentrated state 
ownership in listed companies. It concludes that the primary role of Chinese 
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law in regulating executive compensation should not simply be to curb 
excessive executive pay, but it should be to improve the regulatory structure 
for setting executive pay in a fairer and more transparent way. To achieve 
this, regulatory strategies, especially heightened disclosure and 
strengthening the independence of the compensation committee, must be 
taken. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation1 is an essential element of a corporate 
governance system.2 It is widely acknowledged that optimal pay packages 
can align the interests of managers with those of shareholders as a class.3 
Executive pay is also an issue of public concern and academic debate in 
many jurisdictions, such as the United States (U.S.),4 the United Kingdom 
(U.K.), and other continental European countries.5 There are claims that 
inappropriate compensation practices have contributed to the economic 
crises in recent decades.6 In legal literature, there are two major schools of 
thought on executive compensation: the Board Capture theory and the 
Optimal Contracting theory.7 Advocates of the Board Capture theory claim 
that executives, particularly CEOs in most public corporations have been 
able to “capture” their boards of directors and thus they are able to set their 
own compensation.8 However, Optimal Contracting theorists argue that the 
system of executive compensation is largely working fine because most 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 In this article, the terms “compensation” and “remuneration” are used interchangeably. 
2 ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 222 (2d ed. 2001). 
3 See, e.g., REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 75 (2009). 
4 New executive compensation regulations have been inserted into the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in recent years. 
5 See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Pay: Convergence in Law and Practice Across the 
EU Corporate Government Faultline, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 243 (2004); Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina 
Ungureanu, Economics, Politics, and the International Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: 
An Analysis of Executive Pay at European Banks, 64 VAND. L. REV. 431 (2011); Guido Ferrarini et al., 
Understanding Directors’ Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical Analysis, ECGI Law Working 
Paper No. 126/2009; Guido Ferrarini et al., Executive Remuneration in Crisis: A Critical Assessment of 
Reforms in Europe, 10 J. CORP. L. STUDIES 73 (2010). 
6 See, e.g., Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN. 
MKT. TRENDS 2 (2009). 
7 Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, 
Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95(1) MINN. L. REV. 846, 901 (2011); STEPHEN 
M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 113 (2012) (discussing the 
two camps of scholarships are also termed as “the Managerial Power Model” and “the Arm’s-length 
Bargaining Model”). 
8 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE 
OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 61–79 (2004). 
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boards are able to negotiate the best possible compensation arrangements in 
order to maximize shareholder value.9 
In China, with the dramatic rise in executive compensation in the last 
decade, there has been a considerable concern as to whether the executive 
compensation arrangements are consistent with shareholder and social 
interests. One particular concern is that executives are rewarded excessively 
despite poor firm performance. For example, the aggregate net profit of 
2,469 A-share companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) (A-share Companies10) was 
increased by only 0.85% in 2012.11 However, the aggregate executive 
compensation was increased by 12.4% year on year, amounting to 11.953 
billion RMB yuan.12 Meanwhile, perceived abuses relating to the hidden 
payments for senior executives (e.g. on-duty consumption and excessive 
housing allowance), as well as the vast pay gap between senior management 
and ordinary employees have been the subjects of much public criticism.13 
Although there are various public concerns on executive 
compensation, only a few legislative reforms have been done in China to 
curb the alleged problems among listed companies. In particular, legislative 
attention has not been sufficiently made to the role and the functions of the 
various institutions in setting executive pay, such as the board14 and the 
compensation committee. Also, the existing literature on executive 
compensation has primarily focused on the U.S., the U.K. and continental 
European jurisdictions; but answers to executive pay concerns in China are 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 See, e.g., John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1160 (2005); Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ 
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate 
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate 
Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959 (1980). 
10 “A Shares” refer to the specialized shares that are traded on Chinese stock exchanges. They are 
quoted in Chinese Renminbi. 
11 Wang Jie, Listed Companies Buck the Trend and Increased Executive Pay, BEIJING MORNING 
POST, May 6, 2013, at B01–08. 
12 Id. 
13 See Yang Rong, Research on Executive Compensation of Listed Companies of Monopolistic 
Industries—Based on Perquisite Consumption, 5 FUDAN J. (SOCIAL SCIENCES ED.) 133, 133 (2011). 
14 In this article, “the board” and “the board of directors” are used interchangeably. 
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limited.15 The article thus seeks to fill the literature gap by examining the 
law and practices of executive compensation in the context of China. It 
addresses the special features of executive compensation in China, in 
comparison to the U.S., the U.K., European Commission, Germany and 
Japan. Although this Article focuses largely on China, the comparative 
analysis on the regulations of executive pay would prove useful in assessing 
similar issues in other jurisdictions. The efforts to find a feasible way from 
the recent developments in corporate law to solve the problems of executive 
compensation would also be helpful in future law reforms. 
Under the Company Law of People’s Republic of China 2006 (PRC 
Company Law), the term “executive” or “senior management” (gaoguan) 
refers to “the general manager (zongjingli), the deputy general manager 
(fuzongjingli), the financial officer (caiwufuzeren), the company secretary 
in listed companies and other people as described in its articles of 
association.”16 The “other people as described in its articles of association” 
usually refer to the officers who fall within the first layer of management 
below board level, such as the chief executive officer (CEO), the chief 
financial officer, the chief operation officer, the chief accountant, the chief 
technology officer and the chief legal officer.17 Worth mentioning, the same 
individual may simultaneously hold more than one office in a Chinese 
company.18 Especially, it is very common for a director to participate in the 
day-to-day operation of the firm and serve as the general managers19 or the 
CEO.20 It is also a general practice for a chairman of the board to serve as 
the general manager.21 Thus, the term “executives” also includes the 
chairman of the board and executive directors in the Chinese context. This 
Article examines the executives that fall within the above categories and 
                                                                                                                           
 
15 Previous work in this field has examined the policies on executive compensation from 
economic perspective. However, there is limited legal scholarship examining the executive 
compensation in China from legal and comparative perspectives. 
16 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 217. 
17 See Ge Wei & Gao Minghua, Position Compensation, Comparison Effect and Executive Pay 
Gap, 1 ECON. SURVEY 94 (2013); LIU JUNHAI, COMPANY LAW 156 (China Law Press 2008). 
18 The situation is similar in the U.S. Model Business Corporation Act. Section 8.40(d) provides 
that “The same individual may simultaneously hold more than one office in a corporation.” 
19 For example, the general manager of PetroChina Company Limited is also a director of the 
company. 
20 For example, the CEO of Haier Group is also a director of the group. 
21 Wei & Minghua, supra note 17, at 94. 
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mainly deals with companies whose shares are publicly traded on the two 
stock exchanges in China, i.e. the SSE and the SZSE. 
The structure of the remainder part is as follows. Part II introduces the 
law and practices of executive compensation in China from a comparative 
perspective. This part provides historical insights on the evolution of 
executive pay and the regulatory framework governing executive 
compensation in China. It also identifies special features and problems of 
Chinese compensation practice, based on extensive empirical evidence. Part 
III identifies the underlying institutional, political and social reasons for 
these problems. It specifically discusses the role and functions of the board 
of directors, compensation committee, supervisory board and independent 
directors in the setting of executive pay. Part IV critically examines the role 
of law in regulating the executive compensation as well as the common 
legal strategies that the law employs to address the executive pay problems. 
It then puts forward a set of proposals for improving executive 
compensation in the context of China. Part V draws conclusions. 
II. THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN CHINA 
A. A Historical Overview on Executive Compensation in China 
Executive compensation cannot be understood without a full picture of 
the political and economic development in China. From the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 until late 1978 when the Reform 
and Opening-up policy (gaigekaifang) was launched, China exercised a 
Soviet-style centrally planned economy. There was a traditional weak link 
between compensation and managerial performance during this period. In 
1953, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or the Party) launched the 
socialist reforms (shehuizhuyigaizao) in order to establish a socialist public 
ownership system. When the reforms were completed in 1956, most private 
enterprises were transformed into the so-called “enterprises owned by the 
whole people” (quanminsuoyouzhiqiye).22 Under the public ownership 
system, there was no private business or private capitalism. Managers were 
appointed by the government and their compensation was designed and 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Wang Zhongming, State-owned Enterprise Reform over the Past Sixty Years, ECONOMIC 
INFORMATION DAILY (Sept. 1, 2009), http://finance.ifeng.com/opinion/jjsh/20090901/1181429.shtml. 
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paid by the government. Salary was the basic component of remuneration23 
and equity incentives did not exist. During the economic and social 
campaign—the “Great Leap Forward” (dayuejin) period (1958–1961), and 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), performance-based distribution 
system was seriously affected24 and compensation of managers was 
virtually independent of performance at that time. These social and political 
campaigns caused a disastrous impact on the country’s economy, leading to 
a low level of employee compensation. Evidence also shows that there was 
no significant difference between executive remuneration and the wages of 
ordinary employees from 1950 to 1978.25 
Since 1978, a series of positive regulatory reforms have been taken by 
the CCP to develop the economy of the nation, including, inter alia, 
privatization and modernization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs),26 
development of private businesses, and improvement of the distribution 
system. Laws and administrative regulations were also enacted to 
incentivize executives and encourage the usage of bonus and other pay 
incentives. For example, in 1979, the State Council issued a new regulation 
which required that bonuses must be allocated from retained profits.27 
Enterprises were required to establish the so-called “collective welfare 
fund” (jitifulijijin) and “employee incentive fund” (zhigongjianglijijin).28 
From 1986 to 1988, further regulations were issued to increase the pay gap 
between senior managers and ordinary employees.29 For instance, managers 
were permitted to enjoy one to three times the average wage of 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 On June 16, 1956, the State Council issued the Decision on Salary Reform and set up a system 
for monetary wage. 
24 EMPLOYEE WAGES, BENEFITS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 75–79, 91–
93 (Yan Zhongqin ed., 1987), cited in Yu Guanghua, The Regulation of Executive Compensation in 
China (Jan. 15, 2005), at 2, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535660. 
25 Yu, supra note 24, at 2 (noting that the difference between the remuneration of executives and 
the wages of other employees was not significant from 1950 to 1978). 
26 According to the supervisory authority, State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) can be divided into 
two types in China. Those SOEs that are governed by the central government through the national State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission are considered “Central SOEs”; while the 
SOEs governed by local governments are considered “Local SOEs.” 
27 State Council, Several Regulations on Expanding Management Anatomy for State-owned 
Industrial Enterprise 1979, art. 2. 
28 Id. 
29 Yu, supra note 24, at 3. 
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employees.30 Operators of local enterprises (chengzujingyingzhe) were 
entitled to have one to five times the average wage (including bonus) of 
employees.31 
In contrast to the U.S. where equity incentives have long been widely 
used, the earliest practices of equity incentives in modern China started in 
the early 1980s. In 1984, the Beijing Tianqiao Department Store Company 
was incorporated. It was the first company that converted from an SOE to a 
company limited by shares (youxianzerengongsi), as well as the first 
company that allowed individual employees to purchase company shares 
after the 1978 economic reform.32 In 1994, the Shanghai government issued 
a local regulation which allowed managers to purchase company shares 
through an Employee Shareholding Committee called “zhigongchiguhui.”33 
Since 1994, national guidelines have been relaxed to allow companies to 
issue shares to employees.34 
In addition, in conjunction with the 1978 SOE reform, modern 
executive compensation mechanisms were progressively established and 
the level of executive pay of SOEs was gradually increased. In 1997, the 
Shenzhen government issued the first provisional measure to link pay to 
performance in SOEs.35 In March 2003, the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) 
was established to regulate the central state-owned enterprises (Central 
SOEs). Executive compensation of Central SOEs was also reformed to 
delink it from civil servants’ pay. 
With the above reforms on executive pay, China saw the fastest 
growth of senior management salaries in emerging markets between 2001 
and 2011, rising by 3.5 times; compared to 2.8 times in Brazil, 1.4 times in 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 State Council, Regulations on Further Enterprise Reform 1986, art. 33. 
31 Temporary Regulations on Small-sized Industrial Enterprises Wholly-owned by People 1988, 
art. 33. 
32 Tian Junrong, The First Enterprise Limited by Share in China—Beijing Tianqiao Baihuo 
Limited Company by Share, 9 RENMIN FORUM 27 (1998). 
33 Shanghai Temporary Rules on Employees Ownership Committee in Companies 1994. 
34 See, e.g., Commission for Economic Restructuring and the Securities Commission of the State 
Council, Supplementary Regulations on Rights Issue to Employees by Stock Limited Companies 1994; 
Commission for Economic Restructuring, Guidance on Development of City Share-holding Cooperative 
System 1997. 
35 Shenzhen Temporary Regulations on Annual Remuneration of Managers in State-owned 
Enterprises 1997, art. 1. 
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the U.S., 1.7 times in the U.K., and 2.0 times across Western Europe over 
the same period (Table 1).36 Significantly, executive pay in China soared to 
unprecedented levels in 2006. The year of 2006 also saw the first time that 
the level of executive compensation in the state-controlled listed companies 
(guoyoukonggu shangshigongsi)37 exceeded that in private-controlled listed 
companies.38 In 2007, as a beneficial result of the adoption of the stock 
option schemes and other long-term incentive plans by listed companies, 
the average executive pay increased dramatically by 57.15% (Table 2).39 In 
2012, directors’ compensation of the largest 100 Chinese listed companies 
increased by 82.3%.40 
Arguably, the increase of executive pay in China is largely 
accompanied with the rapid growth of GDP of the nation. During China’s 
eleventh five-year plan period (2006–2010),41 the average growth rate of 
                                                                                                                           
 
36 News Release, Hay Group, Management Salaries in Emerging Markets Now Match European 
Pay, at 1, available at http://www.haygroup.com/downloads/ww/Hay%20Group%20emerging 
%20markets%20press%20release.pdf. 
37 There is no legal definition of the “State-controlled Listed Company.” In practice, the State-
controlled Listed Company usually refers to the Chinese listed companies of which the government or 
state-owned companies own more than 50% of shares, or the resolution of whose shareholder meeting 
can be substantially influenced by the government or state-owned companies, despite the fact that the 
shares held by them account for less than half of the shares of the listed company. 
38 See Yang Zhigang, Research Report: The Level of Executive Pay in State-owned Enterprise 
Exceeded That in Private Enterprises for the First Time in 2006, CHINA SEC. J. (May 29, 2007), 
http://manage.org.cn/observe/200705/47159.html. 
39 Several measures were issued to regulate the equity incentive plans, including the Measures for 
the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies 2005, the Trial Measures for 
Implementing Equity Incentive Plans by State Holding Listed Companies (Domestic) 2006, Notice of 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Measures for the Administration of 
Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial Implementation), Notice of the State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and the Ministry of Finance on 
Issuing the Trial Measures for Implementing Equity Incentive Plans by State Holding Listed Companies 
(Domestic) 2006. See also Du Jing, Theories and Practice of the Legal System of Executive 
Compensation in Listed Companies, 3 TSHINGHUA L. REV 131, 133 (2009). 
40 PROTIVITI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT SUMMARY REPORT ON THE TOP 100 
CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES FOR 2012, at 22, available at http://www.protiviti.com/China-
en/Documents/CN-en-2012-Corporate-Governance-Survey-Report.pdf (stating that “[i]n terms of the 
level of remuneration per capita, the average remuneration of senior executives per capita was 
CNY627,900 this year, with an increase of 14.7% from the previous year. Remuneration of directors per 
capita was CNY682,000, which increased by 92.7% from last year; remuneration of supervisors per 
capita was CNY411,900, which increased by 29.2% from last year.”). 
41 China’s five-year plans are a series of social and economic development initiatives. The goals 
of the eleventh five-year plan were set by the 2006 National People’s Congress session. 
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executive pay in listed companies was 18.1%42 and the GDP growth rate 
during this period was 11.2%43 (Table 2). The increase in executive pay is 
partly due to the influx of foreign investment since China’s entry into WTO 
in 2001, the rapid development of the capital market in 1990s and 2000s, as 
well as the pressure from severe global competition in the human resources 
market. 
Table 1: A Comparison of Total Cash Levels in U.S. Dollars for Senior 
Management Positions in 2001 and 201144 
Country 2001 2011 % change 
China 35,636 123,477 +247 
South Africa 44,405 151,273 +241 
Indonesia 25,250   74,353 +195 
Turkey 65,183 189,170 +190 
Brazil 57,809 162,651 +181 
U.A.E 90,341 204,421 +126 
France 78,929 169,719 +115 
Poland 65,961 136,602 +107 
Netherlands 85,894 175,401 +104 
Italy 87,462 165,168 +89 
Germany 104,155 193,594 +86 
Russia 86,576 153,229 +77 
U.K. 83,246 138,287 +66 
U.S. 112,433 154,847 +38 
Mexico  116,882 145,509 +25 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 Executive Pay Achieved Historical High, ECONOMIC INFORMATION DAILY (Apr. 10, 2013), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2013-04/10/c_124559957.htm. 
43 National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China. 
44 Hay Group, supra note 36, at 3. 
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Table 2: GDP Increase Compared with Year-Over-Year Average Increase 
(%) in Executive and Employee Pay in China45 
Year 
Average Senior 
Management Pay in 
A-share Companies % 
Average National 
Worker Pay % GDP % 
2007   57.15  9.7 13.0 
2008   -4 11.7  8.9 
2009   10.34  7.8  9.1 
2010   8.87 12.3 10.3 
2011   8 13.1  9.2 
B. The Regulatory Framework and the Setting of Executive Compensation 
China’s legal framework for executive compensation is comprised of 
three major levels. The first level contains fundamental laws formulated 
either by the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee. The 
basic provisions regulating the setting of executive compensation are 
contained in the PRC Company Law.46 Under this law, the board of 
directors has the right to determine the recruitment, termination and 
“compensation issues” of managers.47 Directors’ compensation must be 
proposed by the board48 and approved by shareholders in the shareholders’ 
general meeting.49 Nevertheless, shareholders have no votes on individual 
director or manager’s remuneration package, thus directors and managers’ 
                                                                                                                           
 
45 CHINA ADFAITH MANAGEMENT CONSULTING LIMITED COMPANY, CENTER OF BUSINESS 
DATA, CHINA COMPENSATION WHITE PAPER 2012, at 7; Research Report on Executive Compensation in 
Listed Companies 2007, SECURITIES TIMES (May 29, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-
05/29/content_8273288.htm; Towers Perrin Report on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed 
Companies 2008, 21 CEIBS BUS. REV. (2010), http://www.ceibsonline.com/commentary/show/index/ 
classid/2/id/871; Executive Pay Increased Rapidly in 2009, FIRST FINANCIAL DAILY (May 10, 2010), 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1040/59941/11553445.html; Average Executive Compensation in 
Listed Companies in 2010, NANFANG DAILY (May 11, 2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2011-
05/11/c_121403506.htm. 
46 The PRC Personal Income Tax Law 2011 also contains certain regulations on executive 
compensation. However, the PRC Income Tax Law lacks comprehensive regulations on equity 
incentives. See Lou He-tong et al., The Conflicts Between Income Tax Regulations of Executive Equity 
Incentives and Incentive Effect, 9 J. FIN. & ECON. 37 (2010). 
47 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 47(9). 
48 P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, art. 71. 
49 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, arts. 38(2) & 47(9). 
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compensation is in the hands of the board as a whole. Moreover, unlike the 
U.K. where there is a shareholder say-on-pay mechanism mandating a 
shareholder advisory vote on all executive directors’ compensation for 
listed companies, there is no such mechanism in China.50 
The second level mainly involves administrative regulations enacted 
by the State Council, as well as departmental measures formulated by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the SASAC and other 
government agencies with administrative jurisdiction directly under the 
State Council, such as the Administrative Measures for the Issuance of 
Securities by Listed Companies and the Code of Corporate Governance of 
Listed Companies 2002 (the PRC Corporate Governance Code)51 issued by 
the CSRC. The third level includes self-disciplinary rules set by stock 
exchanges, such as the Listing Rules of Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Listing Rules of Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Especially, in contrast to the 
U.S. and the U.K. where it is mandatory for publicly traded companies to 
have compensation committees, Chinese listed companies are not obliged to 
do so.52 The PRC Corporate Governance Code merely provides that the 
board of directors of a listed company may establish a remuneration and 
appraisal committee according to the resolution passed by the shareholders’ 
general meetings.53 The remuneration and appraisal committee is 
responsible for the performance evaluation of directors and managers.54 
It is worth noting that executive compensation of SOEs is subject to 
supervision and heavily regulated by the government. The reform on 
executive compensation in SOEs was also directed and driven by the state, 
not the market solely. After the global financial crisis of 2008, more 
restrictions were imposed on financial institutions and SOEs in order to 
curb the alleged overcompensation to executives in these institutions.55 For 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 See infra text accompanying notes 214–32. 
51 Article 72 of the P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002 provides that executive 
compensation shall be approved by the board, explained at the shareholders’ meetings and disclosed to 
the public. Articles 77 and 78 of the P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002 state that executive 
compensation must be linked to the firm’s performance and the individual manager’s performance. 
52 P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, art. 52. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at art. 70. 
55 See, e.g., Notice of the Ministry of Finance on the Issues in Relating to the Remunerations Paid 
to the Senior Management of the State-owned Financial Institutions for the Year of 2008, CAIJIN 2009, 
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instance, six governmental departments jointly issued a guideline in 2009, 
requiring that executive compensation in Central SOEs must not exceed 30 
times its average worker’s salary of the last financial year.56 In 2013, the 
State Council issued a further notice stating that the growth rate of 
executive pay in SOEs must be lower than that in compensation to ordinary 
employees.57 Nevertheless, these “one-size-fits-all” rules may not be 
effective in regulating executive pay. On the one hand, it may become a 
disincentive for talented executives. On the other hand, a mere cap on 
executive pay does not maximize shareholders’ interests fundamentally. 
Compliance with these guidelines and measures is also an issue in 
practice.58 
C. Features and Problems of Executive Compensation in China 
1. Pay Without Performance? 
Executive compensation is a contentious area. While it is difficult to 
deploy an objective benchmark in estimating the level of executive 
compensation, the public generally believes that there is a wide range of 
problems regarding executive pay. A major concern in the U.S., the U.K. 
and other continental jurisdictions is that executive compensation is not 
aligned to firm performance and executives are paid excessively.59 
Excessive executive compensation seems less pervasive in China than 
in the U.S. Empirical evidence shows the average pay to executives in 
Chinese companies listed on SSE and SZSE (A-share Companies) is lower 
than that in Chinese companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
                                                                                                                           
 
No. 23; and the Standardized Guidelines for the Management of Compensation of Insurance Companies 
(For Trial Implementation), BAOJIANFA 2012, No. 63. 
56 Guidance on Regulating the Compensation of Managers in Key State-owned Enterprises, 
RENSHEBUFA 2009, No. 105. 
57 State Council Notice on Furthering Distribution System Reform, GUOBANHAN 2013, No. 36. 
58 Ignorance of SASAC Rules, NETEASE FINANCE (Feb. 26, 2013), http://money.163.com/13/ 
0226/21/8OM14GPG00252G50.html (noting that some SOEs did not follow these guidelines and 
managed to pay their senior management compensation above the threshold). 
59 Andrew Morse,  Credit Suisse Chief Gets 34% Raise, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324103504578375680999693380.html (noting that 
Credit Suisse Group AG rewarded their CEO with a 34% pay rise, despite a fall in net profit for the year 
2012). 
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(H-share Companies60).61 Also, it is contended that executives in Central 
SOEs earned much less than their counterparts in the same industries, as 
executive pay in these enterprises is heavily regulated by the government62 
and is subject to a ceiling set by the SASAC.63 The pay to general managers 
in state-controlled listed companies is lower than that in non-state-
controlled listed companies.64 
Nonetheless, there is a greater pay increase than net profit growth 
among Chinese listed companies. A 2012 survey shows 239 companies 
listed on SSE and SZSE increased executive compensation despite a fall in 
net profit.65 151 Central SOEs increased their executive pay by 7.25%, 
although they experienced a decline in profitability by 13.89%.66 In the case 
of Liaoning Huajin Tongda Chemicals Company Limited, the net profit 
decreased significantly by 97.67% and the stock price dropped by 10.39% 
in 2012, while the executive pay was increased by 23.60% and the 
aggregate executive pay accounted for 51.93% of the net profit of the 
firm.67 In the case of Fangda Special Steel Technology Company Limited, 
the pay of the chairman of the board increased significantly by 658% year-
over-year while the net profit declined by 27.61%.68 Table 3 displays the 
top-ten payers for executive compensation among A-share Companies in 
                                                                                                                           
 
60 “H shares” refers to the shares of companies incorporated in mainland China that are traded on 
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
61 The List of Top Executive Pay in Chinese Listed Companies 2011, FORBES (Chinese Net) 
(June 27, 2012), http://www.forbeschina.com/review/201206/0017913_all.shtml. 
62 Lower Pay for Executives in Central SOEs, CHINANEWS (Feb. 22, 2011), http://finance.ifeng 
.com/news/20110222/3450412.shtml. 
63 Guidance on Regulating the Compensation of Managers in Key State-owned Enterprises, supra 
note 56. 
64 The Growth Rate of Executive Compensation in Listed Companies Declined, MERCER (Oct. 11, 
2012), available at http://cn.mercer.com/press-releases/2011-China-ER-and-LTI-Trends. 
65 Yu Ping, 239 Listed Companies Increased Executive Compensation Despite Declining Profits, 
CHINA SEC. J. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/gsyj/201303/t20130329_3926260.html. 
66 Id. 
67 The List of Top Executive Compensation in Listed Companies 2012, GUANGZHOU DAILY 
(Mar. 13, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-03/09/c_124435943.htm. 
68 Yu Yaofeng, The Annual Compensation of the Chairman of the Board of the Fangda Special 
Steel Technology Achieved 15.16 Million, NAT’L BUS. DAILY (Feb. 2, 2013), http://finance.sina.com.cn/ 
money/cfgs/20130207/030414525135.shtml. 
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2012 and shows that there is a greater pay increase than the profit increase 
in a number of companies.69 
Indeed, a publicly traded firm’s profitability is affected by various 
factors, such as the overall performance of the economy and industry. 
Therefore, it is hard to estimate the optimal scale of excessive executive 
pay or to draw a correlation between pay and performance. Nonetheless, 
increasing executive pay despite the decline in profit deserves a certain 
level of regulatory scrutiny, as it would inevitably increase public concern 
on effective corporate governance of a company and dent public confidence 
in the company. 
Table 3: Aggregate Top-Ten Compensation Firms in A-share Companies 
201270 







1 Vanke-A -3.93 30.40 
2 Ping An Bank 59.3 30.39 
3 Fangda Special Steel 72.73 -27.61 
4 TCL Group -7.28 -21.43 
5 Xingye Securities 39.33 9.42 
6 AVIC Real Estate 28.66 28.66 
7 Sanyou Chemical -13.67 -13.67 
8 Metersbonwe -23.72 -29.55 
9 Tianhong Shopping -4.12 2.4 
10 Huawen Media -14.67 5.35 
                                                                                                                           
 
69 For example, the companies ranked No. 2, 3 and 5 in Table 3 show a greater pay increase than 
profit increase. 
70 This table is drafted based on the List of Top Executive Compensation in Listed Companies 
2012, supra note 67. It is worth noting the aggregate compensation reflects only those amounts reported 
in the firms’ annual summary compensation. It omits some significant compensation, such as pension 
schemes and on-duty consumption. This table displays the figure for A-share Companies listed on the 
SSE and the SZSE. 
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2. The Prevalence of Non-Equity and Short-term Compensation 
A well-designed compensation package with adequate incentives is 
considered a way to reduce agency costs and to align the interests of 
executives with those of shareholders.71 In modern corporations, executive 
compensation is typically a mixture of various components.72 It is grouped 
into three basic categories: (1) salary and benefits that do not depend on the 
firm’s performance; (2) stock options and other incentive compensation that 
is based on the performance of the firm’s stock price; and (3) bonuses and 
other incentive compensation that is based on the firm’s performance 
according to specified accounting metrics.73 The most important reward for 
managers of publicly traded companies today is equity compensation, e.g., 
stock options, restricted stock and stock appreciation rights.74 In theory, 
equity compensation is considered the most effective tool for aligning the 
interests of executives and shareholders75 as “the market value of the stock 
reflects the present value of the entire future stream of expected cash 
flows.”76 If CEOs own a large percentage of corporate equity, the generally 
weak link between cash compensation and corporate performance would be 
less troubling.77 Evidence from Chinese listed companies also proves that 
there is a positive correlation between firm performance and the number of 
stock options held by the managers.78 Nonetheless, salary and other non-
performance-based compensation schemes lack incentives that align the 
interests of managers and shareholders and they can cause those interests to 
further diverge.79 
                                                                                                                           
 
71 See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 618 (2011). 
72 BRUCE R. ELLIG, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (New York 2002), at 
ch. 1 (noting that the five basic compensation elements are: salary, employee benefits, short-term 
incentives, long-term incentives, and perquisites). 
73 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 113. 
74 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 75. 
75 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay, But 
How, 68 HARV. BUS. REV., no. 3, 1990, at 138, 153. 
76 MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS, AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 146 (2000). 
77 Id. 
78 Zhou Jianbo & Sun Jusheng, The Research on Governance Effect of Top-management Stock 
Incentive-Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, 5 ECON. RES. J. 74, 81–82 (2003). 
79 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 113. 
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A 2011 study finds the long-term performance plan was the most 
heavily-weighted element in the CEO pay package in 300 of the largest 
U.S. companies, making up 27.7% of the average CEO’s total 
compensation.80 A 2012 survey shows 76% of a sample of 233 companies 
in the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) Index adopted the stock options 
scheme; 81% adopted the performance long-term incentive plan and 58% 
had the restricted stock scheme.81 
In contrast to its U.S. counterpart, there is much less usage of equity-
based compensation in China.82 At present, the primary source of 
remuneration of executives in listed companies is non-equity 
compensation—salary and annual bonus. Among the largest 100 companies 
listed on SSE and SZSE, only 26 companies employed equity incentives for 
senior management and merely 13 had stock ownership plan for 
employees.83 In particular, as executives in SOEs are generally appointed 
by the government and frequently reappointed to other government bodies 
after a short term, SOEs tend not to grant long-term equity incentives but 
short-term incentives for executives. From 2008 to April 2011, the listed 
companies that employed equity incentives (including stock options and 
restricted stock) were mainly private-controlled companies, but not state-
controlled companies.84 In 2011, only 18 state-controlled listed companies 
disclosed the adoption of equity incentives.85 
There are several contributing factors that led to the prevalence of non-
equity compensation in China. As discussed,86 China took a long time to 
embrace equity compensation. Equity compensation was not widely 
adopted by Chinese companies until 2006. At present, a listed company 
must inform and file the equity incentive schemes to the CSRC, the stock 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 The Wall Street Journal/Hay Group 2011 CEO Compensation Study, HAY GROUP, available at 
http://www.haygroup.com/ww/downloads/details.aspx?id=33830. 
81 See Executive Rewards 2012: Global Trends, MERCER, available at http://www.mercer.com/ 
wbdownload.dyn?wcSession=14580550&nmeDownloadPath=/attachments/English/120523_Mercer_Gl
obal_ER_trends_webcast_final.pdf, at 6 (This study is based on a sample of 233 companies in the S&P 
500 Index.). 
82 Rong, supra note 13, at 136. 
83 PROTIVITI, supra note 40, at 10. 
84 The Growth Rate of Executive Compensation in Listed Companies Declined, supra note 64. 
85 Id. 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 32–35. 
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exchange and local securities regulatory authority.87 Especially, the state-
controlled listed companies need to obtain consent from relevant regulatory 
authorities on the proposed equity incentive before the proposal is 
submitted to the shareholders’ general meeting for approval.88 These 
companies also need to fulfill special corporate governance requirements in 
order to adopt equity incentives.89 
Moreover, Chinese law takes a conservative view towards equity 
incentives. Under PRC Company Law,90 companies are only allowed to 
repurchase shares from employees for up to 5% of the issued shares in 
order to underwrite equity incentives for employees.91 For state-controlled 
listed companies that grant equity incentives to executives for the first time, 
only 1% of the total shares are permitted to issue stock option.92 This figure 
is even lower than that in Germany, where up to 10% of the issued shares is 
allowed to underwrite employee equity incentive plans.93 
3. Grey Income, On-duty Consumption and Political Reward 
Grey income (huiseshouru) for executives has long attracted a great 
deal of attention in China. There is a concern that the disclosed aggregate 
executive compensation in annual reports does not reflect the actual income 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Notice of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission on Promulgating the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed 
Companies (For Trial Implementation), ZHENGJIANGONGSIZI 2005, No. 151, art. 33. 
88 Notice of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council and the Ministry of Finance on Issuing the Trial Measures for Implementing Equity Incentive 
Plans by State Holding Listed Companies (Domestic), GUOZIFAFENPEI 2006, No. 175; The Trial 
Measures for Implementing Equity Incentive Plans by State Holding Listed Companies (Domestic), art. 
25. 
89 For example, Article 5 of the Trial Measures for Implementing Equity Incentive Plans by State 
Holding Listed Companies (Domestic) provides that, in order to adopt the equity incentives, the 
compensation committee of state-controlled listed companies must consist of outside directors only and 
the board of directors must consist of at least half of outside directors. 
90 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 143. 
91 Before the revision of the P.R.C. Company Law in 2006, a company was permitted to 
repurchase shares only if the registered capital was reduced or when the company merged with another 
company holding shares in this company. 
92 See supra note 87, at art. 14. 
93 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 76 (noting that Germany only recently allowed publicly 
traded companies to repurchase up to 10% of their outstanding shares in order to underwrite stock 
option compensation plans). 
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of executives, as it omits grey income, such as hidden payments, subsidies 
and extra bonuses. As far as SOEs in monopolized industries are concerned, 
a major source of grey income is various kinds of subsidies,94 such as 
housing allowance and shopping vouchers. The average take-home income 
of employees in these monopolized industries is much higher than that in 
other industries as well.95 
On-duty consumption (zaizhixiaofei) in the form of travel expenses, 
entertainment fees, overseas conference fees and communication expenses 
also constitutes a substantial component of executive income, especially 
those in SOEs.96 A study of 1,320 Chinese listed companies found that the 
aggregate amount of on-duty consumption spent by executives was 2 to 50 
times their average compensation between 2002 and 2009.97 The ratio has 
been increasing in recent years.98 Also, evidence shows a negative 
correlation between on-duty consumption and firm performance in 
companies listed on the SSE and SZSE. In other words, as on duty 
consumption increases, company performance decreases and vice versa.99 
The prevalence of on-duty consumption has its origins in China’s 
distinct legal and political institutions and the lack of transparency. First of 
all, listed companies are not required to disclose executives’ on-duty 
consumption by law. Also, the corporate leadership appointments in SOEs 
are made in a highly institutionalized sharing arrangement between the 
Party and SASAC.100 The appointment of senior executives in SOEs is 
usually made by the Organization Department of the Communist Party of 
China Central Committee (zhonggongzhongyangzuzhibu) as well as the 
                                                                                                                           
 
94 See Ding Shuo, Preliminary Studies of Grey Income in China, 10 SPECIAL ZONE ECONOMY 
268, 268 (2007). 
95 Id. 
96 See Liang Tong-Ying, Feng Li & Chen Xiude, Pyramid Structure, Executive Perks and 
Corporate Value: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, 11 J. SHANXI FIN. & ECON. 
UNIV. 75, 76 (2012) (noting that on-duty consumption constitutes a significant part of the executive’s 
pay). Qie Jianrong, National Audit Office Disclosed Illegal Distribution of Welfare by Central SOEs, 
LEGAL DAILY (May 21, 2011), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index_article/content/2011-05/21/ 
content_2669997.htm?node=5955. 
97 Rong, supra note 13, at 133. 
98 Id. 
99 Feng Genfu & Zhao Yuhang, Manager Compensation, On-duty Consumption and Firm 
Performance, 6 CHINA INDUS. ECON. 147, 156 (2012). 
100 Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the 
Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697, 737–38 (2013). 
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SASAC. These executives are paid like bureaucrats and their pay is 
considered a highly sensitive issue to the Party. Thus, SASAC generally 
does not disclose executive pay of SOEs, not to mention the grey income.101 
Arguably, the lack of transparency makes it possible for executives to seek 
grey income by way of corruption, accounting fraud or abuse of powers. 
Moreover, as executive pay of SOEs is subject to a cap set by the 
SASAC, it is not surprising that executives rely on political rewards as their 
incentives. In fact, it is very common for top executives in Central SOEs to 
hold vice ministerial rank.102 It is also a general practice that these 
executives serve as senior government officials such as provincial 
governors and members of the State Council after their term of office in the 
SOEs.103 
4. The Pay Gap Between Executives and Employees 
The disparity in compensation between executives and employees is 
another typical concern on executive pay. In the U.S., executives are 
frequently accused of getting vastly more than other employees in the 
company. CEOs of S&P 500 Index Companies earned on average 354 times 
the average wages of workers in 2012.104 It is worth noting that the pay gap 
between executives and ordinary workers in China seems more reasonable 
than its American counterpart. Empirical evidence from 1,672 Chinese 
listed companies finds the aggregate executive pay was 12.83 times the 
average pay to ordinary employees in 2010.105 Companies which had 4 to 5 
times pay gap accounted for 55.02% in the dataset.106 
                                                                                                                           
 
101 Jiang Yunzhang, Ineffective Rules to Cap Executive Pay of Central SOEs, ECON. OBSERVER 
(July 27, 2013), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130727/002616258459.shtml. 
102 The Appointment and Selection of Top Executives in Central SOEs, CHINA NEWS WEEK 
(June 3, 2013), http://news.163.com/13/0603/12/90ENTMCN0001124J.html. 
103 Jiang Chao & Wang Chen, Ex-Executives in SOEs Serve in the State, CAIXIN (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://special.caixin.com/2013-03-20/100503822.html. 
104 CEO-to-Worker Pay Ratios Around the World, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-
Watch/CEO-Pay-and-You/CEO-to-Worker-Pay-Gap-in-the-United-States/Pay-Gaps-in-the-World#_ftn1 
(last visited May 14, 2014). 
105 Gao Minghua, Expanded Pay Gap Between Executives and Ordinary Employees, 11 
DIRECTORS & BOARD 109 (2011). 
106 Id. 
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Nonetheless, there is still public perception that the pay gap is too big 
in China, given that the overall wage level of Chinese workers is relatively 
low. One extreme example is that the pay of the general manager of the 
Ping An Insurance Group was 2,751 times the average national worker pay 
of Chinese enterprises in 2007.107 Moreover, the pay gap has increased 
considerably over time, especially in state-controlled listed companies. The 
gap between executive pay of the state-controlled listed companies and the 
average worker pay of Chinese enterprises increased from 12.7 times in 
2002 to 24.3 times in 2006.108 In 2011, the average CEO pay of state-
controlled listed companies was 15.9 times the average worker salaries in 
public sector.109 The increasing pay gap within these companies inevitably 
increases public concern, since their profitability is not mainly contributed 
by executives, but largely by the fact that they are in monopolized sectors, 
such as electricity, telecommunication, and petroleum. 
III. WHY ARE THERE PROBLEMATIC PAY PRACTICES? 
A. Agency Problems in Setting Executive Pay 
Agency costs arise from separation of ownership and control.110 In 
modern corporations, agency costs typically reflect the divergence between 
employees and shareholders, as well as the monitoring and bonding 
expenditures undertaken to reduce that divergence. Leading managerial 
power theorists Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argue that director 
behavior in deciding executive pay is subject to an obvious agency 
problem.111 Specifically, directors would not automatically seek to 
maximize shareholder value in setting executive compensation and there is 
potential divergence between executives and shareholders. They listed ten 
                                                                                                                           
 
107 Zhao Peng, Report Finds Executive Pay Was Increased by 370 Thousands While Employee 
Pay Was Increased by 30 Thousands Only, BEIJING TIMES (Oct. 17, 2012), http://finance.sina.com.cn/ 
china/20121017/014913387940.shtml. 
108 Ju Jinwen, SOE Executive Pay System Need Top-Down Design, 9 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 96, 
97 (2012). 
109 Id. 
110 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
111 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 
17(4) J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 12 (2005). 
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possible incentives that make directors favor the company’s executives, 
including, incentives to be re-elected, CEOs’ power to benefit directors, 
friendship and loyalty, collegiality and authority, cognitive dissonance and 
solidarity, the small cost of favoring executives, ratcheting, limits of market 
forces, new CEOs and firing of executives.112 
In Chinese context, the distinct pattern of ownership and control has 
implications for the agency problem and the determination of executive 
compensation.113 Since 1990s, the economic growth and the development of 
capital market have been state-led.114 The current legal mechanisms and 
corporate governance institutions are, to a certain extent, designed and set 
up for the purpose of maintaining the control of the government.115 Thus, 
the Chinese government retained firm control over SOEs, especially those 
in national security-related industries, natural monopolies sector providing 
important public goods and services, and pillar industries.116 As most listed 
companies are transformed from former SOEs, companies controlled by a 
single state shareholder (the “one-dominant controlling shareholder 
phenomenon”) are very common at present (the so-called “yigududa”). To 
illustrate, the largest controlling shareholder, who is usually the state 
shareholder, owns the majority of shares in a company.117 
In contrast to the U.S. which features a stock market-centered capital 
market, or Germany and Japan that rest on a bank-centered capital 
market,118 China is characterized by a capital market dominated by 
                                                                                                                           
 
112 Id. 
113 M. Conyon & L. He, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China, CORNELL 
INST. COMPENSATION STUDIES 2011-003, at 8 (2011), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ics/6. 
114 Since late 2005, China has been implementing a nation-wide reform for listed companies in an 
effort to reduce the ratio of state-owned shares. See China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
Governing Measures for Reforming the Ownership Structure of Listed Companies, ZHENGJIANFA 2005, 
No. 86. 
115 Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for 
Developing Democracies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 260–61 (2011) (noting that the laws were enacted or 
revised for the purpose of the SOE reform). 
116 For corporatization of SOEs in China, see, e.g., Donald C. Clarke & Nicholas C. Howson, 
Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions in the People’s Republic of China, in 
THE DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 245–49 (Dan 
Puchniak et al. eds., 2012). 
117 Helen Hu et al., Internal Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance in China (Jan. 15, 
2009), ASIA PACIFIC J. MGMT. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1328684. 
118 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 
AM. J. COMP. L. 1329 (2001). 
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controlling state shareholders.119 Empirical evidence from the largest 100 
A-share Companies shows the highest shareholding ratio of the largest five 
shareholders reached 86%, and the average shareholding ratio was 43% in 
2012 (Table 4).120 Significantly, SOEs were the largest shareholders in 
more than 80% of the largest 100 companies in the past five years (Table 
5).121 Although the average shareholding ratio of the largest shareholders 
declined slightly year by year, it remained at an average of around 40% in 
the past three years.122 This reveals a very high concentration level of state 
shareholdings of Chinese listed companies. 
In theory, the dispersed or concentrated nature of the shareholder body 
may influence the role of the board in public companies.123 It may affect 
what the board does and to whom it is accountable.124 In dispersed 
shareholding companies, the most pressing agency problem exists between 
management and shareholders as a class; while in concentrated 
shareholding companies, the agency relationship is more problematic 
between majority and minority shareholders.125 As China has a high 
concentrated ownership structure, the agency relationship between 
controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders is problematic. In 
the realm of executive compensation, the key concern for minority 
shareholders is whether controlling shareholders exercise their corporate 
rights to promote only their own interests or those of the shareholders as a 
whole in the negotiation or setting of executive compensation. 
                                                                                                                           
 
119 Helen Hu et al., supra note 117. 
120 PROTIVITI, supra note 40; see also Jiang Jianxiang, The Ownership Structure of Chinese SOEs 
and Their Legal Reforms, 6 SCI. L. 131, 133 (2012). 
121 PROTIVITI, supra note 40. 
122 Id. 
123 Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Boards in Europe—Accountability and Convergence, 61 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 301, 303 (2013). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 304. 
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Table 4: The Largest Shareholder Blocks in the Top 100 Chinese Listed 
Companies 2010–2012126 
 2010 2011 2012 
Average % 46 45 43 
Maximum % 86 86 86 
Minimum % 20 19 20 
Table 5: The State Ownership of the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies 
2008–2012127 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
State shareholder being the 
largest shareholder % 85 86 88 86 84 
State shareholder being the 
2nd largest shareholder % 42 32 34 48 49 
State shareholder being the 
3rd largest shareholder % 29 23 24 37 39 
B. Arm’s Length Dealing by the Board? 
As discussed, there are two major camps in scholarship on executive 
compensation: the Board Capture theory which claims that CEOs have 
effectively “captured” the boards of directors who nominally set their pay; 
and the Optimal Contracting theory which argues that the system of 
executive compensation is largely working fine because most boards are 
able to negotiate the best possible compensation arrangements.128 The 
Chinese story seems not to support the Optimal Contracting theory, but 
                                                                                                                           
 
126 PROTIVITI, supra note 40. 
127 The table is drafted based on the Protiviti’s Corporate Governance Assessment Summary 
Reports on the Top 100 Chinese Listed Companies from 2006 to 2012 (The dataset is the top 100 
Chinese listed companies based on market value. The aggregate market value of the selected top 100 
listed companies in the 2012 report accounted for 60% of the total market value in China’s A-share 
market; the assets accounted for 90% of the total asset value of A-share Companies and the profits 
accounted for 80% of the total profit of A-share Companies.). For the Assessment Methodology, see 
PROTIVITI, supra note 40. 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 7–9. 
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supports the Board Capture theory. As a practical matter, the setting of 
executive compensation in Chinese companies does not seem to be guided 
by shareholder interests and not does not operate at arm’s length from the 
executives whose pay they set. 
First, under PRC Company Law, the right to appoint directors is vested 
with the shareholders’ general meeting,129 but the law does not specify the 
ways on how directors are nominated. Procedure of nomination and 
appointment of directors are left to be determined by the company articles 
of association. Under the CSRC Opinion, the board of directors, the 
supervisory board, or shareholders who separately or collectively have 
more than 1% of shareholdings of the company are eligible to nominate 
independent directors.130 The PRC Company Law provides that 
shareholders with more than 3% of shareholdings (separately or 
collectively) of the companies have the right to nominate directors.131 The 
appointment of directors is determined by ordinary resolution at a 
shareholder general meeting, which requires the support of more than half 
of the shares with voting rights of the shareholders or their agents present at 
the meeting.132 Therefore, even if one shareholder who holds more than half 
of the voting rights, votes in favor of the board proposal, the resolution so 
passed will be effective.133 These articles enable controlling shareholders to 
control the appointment of directors. 
In practice, it is customary for shareholders to nominate directors. The 
board would generally have an internal discussion with controlling 
shareholders and large shareholders on the nomination of directors.134 
However, as there is no disclosure requirement on how directors are 
nominated, it is not clear how shareholders and the board bargain over the 
nomination of directors. While the factors for consideration vary from firm 
to firm, arguably, the shareholding of the nominators would be an 
                                                                                                                           
 
129 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, arts. 38 & 100. 
130 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to 
the Board of Directors of Listed Companies 2001, art. 4(1). 
131 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 103. 
132 Id. at art. 104. 
133 Wei Cai, Path Dependence and Concentration of Ownership and Control of Companies Listed 
in China, 20(8) INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 281, 291 (2009). 
134 Xiong Jinqiu, Improve the System of Nomination of Directors, NAT’L BUS. DAILY, June 2, 
2012, http://ntt.nbd.com.cn/articles/2012-06-02/658010.html. 
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influential factor in the nomination discussion. In the concentrated 
shareholding context, since the board is dominated by controlling 
shareholders, it will likely act as the protector of the controlling 
shareholders, rather than the shareholders as a class. The controlling 
shareholders can always have their wishes at the meeting and make the 
meeting into a mere formality.135 This arrangement inevitably creates a very 
high-powered conflict of interest on the board. 
Second, as noted, executives of SOEs are usually appointed by the 
state and it is a general practice for ex-executives to serve as government 
officials after their term of office.136 According to a 2007 survey, almost 
27% of the CEOs in a sample of newly partially privatized SOEs were 
former or current government bureaucrats.137 Presumably, given their 
political connection with the Party, these executives would have strong 
influence over the board and be able to reward themselves with better pay 
packages.138 Empirical evidence also shows that executive pay is higher, 
and less sensitive to performance, when executives have more power.139 
Meanwhile, the effect of incentives is less, when controlling shareholders 
have more controlling powers.140 
Third, as observed by Professors Bebchuk and Fried, even in 
companies with diversified shareholding structure, directors would prefer to 
go along with arrangements that favor the company’s top executives, given 
a variety of economic incentives and psychological factors, such as 
                                                                                                                           
 
135 Hui Huang, Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative 
Analysis, 27 B.F.L.R. 619 (2012). 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 102–03. 
137 Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong & Tianyu Zhang, Politically Connected CEOs, Corporate 
Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 
330, 330 (2007). 
138 To prevent controlling shareholders from exercising influence over the nomination process, 
Article 20 of the P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code provides that “the nominated candidates shall 
process relevant expertise and decision-making, as well as the ability to supervise the board.” 
“Controlling shareholders shall not approve the nomination of directors or appoint executives without 
the approval of the general meeting.” Article 31 of the code also provides that cumulative voting must 
be employed in listed companies which have controlling shareholders who possess more than 30% 
shareholdings. Nevertheless, as the code is disciplinary and enforceable by law, compliance with the 
code is an issue in practice. 
139 Quan Xiaofeng, Wu Shinong & Wen Fang, Management Power, Incentives and 
Compensation, 11 ECON. RES. 73, 85 (2010). 
140 Xia Jijun & Zhang Yan, The Conflicts Between Control Rights and Incentives: An Empirical 
Analysis on the Effect of Stock Incentives in China, 3 ECON. RES. J. 87, 97 (2008). 
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collegiality, team spirit and friendship.141 In China, although a director is 
excluded from participating in the board’s evaluation of his or her own 
compensation package,142 there is no reason to assume that the board of 
directors would not consider the above factors while fixing executive 
compensation. Especially, as Chinese law does not require separation of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board, it is very common for a director or a 
chairman of the board to serve as the general manager or the CEO 
simultaneously.143 Arguably, these directors are able to exercise 
considerable influence over the design of their own remuneration, given 
their power in the company. 
C. Ineffective Compensation Committees 
In the U.S. and the U.K., the compensation committee plays a 
significant role in designing appropriate pay programs that are in the 
company’s best interests. In comparison, Chinese laws seem inadequate in 
addressing the role of compensation committees in the setting of executive 
pay. 
First, unlike the U.S. where the compensation committee is 
compulsory for listed companies,144 Chinese listed companies are not 
obliged to set up compensation committees.145 In the U.K., compensation 
committees have delegated responsibility for reviewing and approving 
compensation for senior executives.146 It sets the compensation for all 
executive directors and the chairman, and recommends to the board the 
compensation levels for senior management immediately below board 
level.147 It is responsible for appointing consultants in respect of executive 
                                                                                                                           
 
141 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 111, at 10. 
142 P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, art. 71. 
143 Wei & Minghua, supra note 17, at 94. 
144 NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.05, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ (last visited 
May 14, 2014). 
145 P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, art. 52. It provides that “the board of a listed 
company may, according to the shareholder resolution, establish specialized committees such as the 
strategy committee, the audit committee, the nomination committee and the compensation committee.” 
146 These duties include setting compensation values and overseeing corporate information. 
Members in the committee also have an implied duty of care and loyalty. 
147 U.K. Corporate Governance Code § D.2.2 (2012). 
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director compensation.148 However, the PRC Company Law is silent on the 
roles and duties of the compensation committee.149 
Also, the U.K. Corporate Governance Code specifies the setting of the 
performance-related remuneration for executive directors (e.g. variable 
compensation should be reclaimable in exceptional circumstances of 
misstatement or misconduct)150 and regulations on the so-called “reward for 
failure issue” (avoiding the payment of excessive compensation when a 
director is removed during his or her term of office).151 On the contrary, 
there is no such regulation under PRC Corporate Governance Code. The 
code simply provides a general provision stating that the main duties of the 
remuneration and appraisal committee are, “(1) to study the appraisal 
standard for directors and management personnel, to conduct appraisal and 
to make recommendations; and (2) to study and review the remuneration 
policies and schemes for directors and senior management personnel.”152 
Meanwhile, although the CSRC Measures state that the compensation 
committee is responsible for drafting the equity incentive schemes, the 
committee has no deciding power over the schemes and the approval right 
is left with the board.153 Due to the legislative gaps, many compensation 
committees are operating without a clear role and objective. 
Second, independence of compensation committees is an important 
factor in ensuring fair executive compensation. Many jurisdictions require 
compensation committees to operate on an independent basis. Under the 
NYSE Listed Manual, members in the compensation committee must 
consist of independent directors only.154 The U.K. Corporate Governance 
Code provides that “a remuneration committee [shall consist] of at least 
                                                                                                                           
 
148 U.K. Corporate Governance Code § D.2 (2012). 
149 Article 117 of the P.R.C. Company Law merely provides that a company shall make regular 
disclosure on the compensation of directors, supervisor and senior management. 
150 U.K. Corporate Governance Code § A (2012). 
151 U.K. Corporate Governance Code § D.1.4–1.5 (2012). 
152 P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, arts. 52, 56 & 70. 
153 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Notice of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission on Promulgating the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed 
Companies (For Trial Implementation), ZHENGJIANGONGSIZI (2005), No. 151, art. 28. 
154 NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 144, § 303A.05 (stating that the compensation 
committee of an exchange-listed company must be comprised of independent directors. Only listed 
companies in which a shareholder or group of shareholders acting together own 50 percent or more of 
the stock are exempt from this requirement.). 
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three, or in the case of smaller companies two, independent non-executive 
directors.”155 
Nevertheless, the PRC Corporate Governance Code simply requires a 
majority of independent directors in the compensation committee.156 There 
is no explanation as to what constitutes “majority” and there is no 
standardized procedure on the appointment of chairman and members of the 
committee either. It is argued that a simple majority of independent 
directors is not enough to ensure the committee functions in a truly 
independent fashion. Even if the majority of committee members are 
independent directors, there is a reasonable doubt as to how they could 
determine the executive pay independently and provide impartial advice, as 
the independent directors of the compensation committee have to work in a 
collegiate manner with the executives in a board structure.157 In fact, 
independent directors have long been accused of being too close to 
executives, and thus biased in favor of high awards.158 
A 2007 survey shows 89.14% of the companies listed on SZSE set up 
compensation committees. Among them, independent directors accounted 
for 60.7% in compensation committees.159 92% of the companies listed on 
SSE established compensation committees and 87% of them had 
independent directors being the majority of the compensation 
committees.160 A 2008 survey indicates that more than half of the A-share 
Companies did not disclose the composition of compensation committees 
                                                                                                                           
 
155 U.K. Corporate Governance Code § D.2.1 (2012). 
156 P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 2002, art. 52. 
157 Ruth Bender, Paying for Advice: The Role of the Remuneration Consultant in U.K. Listed 
Companies, 64 VAND. L. REV. 361, 370 (2011). 
158 See, e.g., Brian G.M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive 
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 IND. & CORP. CHANGE 293, 326–28 
(1995); Brian G.M. Main & James Johnston, Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance, 23 
ACC. & BUS. RES. 351, 534–36 (1993); Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, 3 HANDBOOK OF 
LABOR ECONOMICS 2485, 2517–18 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999), cited in Ruth Bender, 
Paying for Advice: The Role of the Remuneration Consultant in U.K. Listed Companies, 64 VAND. L. 
REV. 361, 370 (2011). 
159 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Practices of Independent Directors, Audit Committees and 
Remuneration Committees in Companies Listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2007, http://news 
.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2008-06/03/content_8307969.htm. 
160 Wu Minghui, Practices of Audit Committees and Remuneration Committees in Companies 
Listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange 2007, available at http://business.sohu.com/20080604/ 
n257262589.shtml. 
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and among those companies that disclosed the composition of 
compensation committees, only 59% had independent directors being the 
chairmen of the compensation committees.161 However, the compensation 
committees play a limited role in executive pay arrangements in the sense 
that they can only advise on pay issues, and have no deciding power over 
executive remuneration. Evidence also indicates compensation committees 
only advised on executive pay issues one to two times a year on average.162 
D. Directors’ Duties 
Duties of directors (including statutory duties and common law duties) 
play an important role in mitigating the shareholders’ agency problem as 
well as the setting of executive pay. While the connotation of directors’ 
duties varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the duty of care and the duty 
of loyalty are generally considered the core duties owned by directors to the 
shareholders and the corporation.163 Directors owe a duty of care to act with 
reasonable skill, care and diligence.164 This duty is mostly concerned with 
how directors perform their responsibilities.165 Directors also owe a duty of 
loyalty in that directors are required to exercise their institutional power 
over corporate processes or property in a good-faith effort to advance the 
interests of the company.166 Particularly, in the negotiation of executive 
pay, directors have a duty to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence, as 
well as to pursue the best interests of the corporation and shareholders.167 
Meanwhile, shareholders who believe they have been harmed by the acts of 
the directors in the designing of an executive package, have a right to bring 
derivative or direct actions to recover excessive or inappropriate 
compensation.168 
                                                                                                                           
 
161 Towers Perrin Report on Executive Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies 2008, CEIBS 
BUS. REV. 1 (2010), http://www.ceibsonline.com/commentary/show/index/classid/2/id/871. 
162 See PROTIVITI, supra note 40, at 18. 
163 See PAUL DAVIS, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 488 (Sweet & Maxwell 2008). 
164 U.K. Companies Act 2006 § 174. 
165 JAMES A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ & OFFICERS’ LIABILITY § 2:2.3 (2d ed. 2010), cited in Daniel 
Crane, Excessive Compensation Without a Remedy, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 281, 287 (2013). 
166 WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATION 295 (3d ed. 2009). 
167 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 136 (7th ed. 2008). 
168 Id. at 136–61. 
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Fiduciary duties of directors were not officially introduced and 
codified in China until 2006, when the revised PRC Company Law was 
enacted.169 Article 148 of the PRC Company Law states that the directors, 
supervisors and senior executives of a company shall comply with the laws, 
administrative regulations and the articles of association of the company 
and bear the duties of loyalty and due diligence towards the company. 
Regrettably, the law does not expressly define the duty of loyalty 
(zhongcheng yiwu). It simply provides a list of prohibited activities by 
directors and officers to assist practitioners in understanding the 
connotation of the duty of loyalty.170 These activities include: 
(1) acceptance of bribes or illegal income; (2) seizure of company asset; 
(3) misappropriation of company funds; (4) opening accounts with the 
company capital in the (director’s) own name or others name; (5) providing 
capital to other parties with the company’s capital or providing security to 
third parties with the company’s asset, without authorization from the 
constitution, or consent from shareholders’ general meeting or the board of 
directors; (6) conclusion of contracts or conducting self-dealing transaction 
with the company, without consent from shareholders; (7) expropriation of 
company opportunities without consent from shareholders; (8) conducting 
competitive business with the company; and (9) breaches of confidentiality. 
The duty of diligence (qinmian yiwu) is not defined clearly under the 
PRC Company Law either. To help the public have a better understanding 
of the duty, Article 98 of the CSRC Guidelines for Articles of Association 
of Listed Companies 2006 specifies that directors’ duty of diligence 
includes: (1) treating all shareholders equally; (2) understanding the 
business operations of the company; (3) endorsement on the regular reports 
of the company in written form and ensuring that the disclosed information 
is true, accurate and complete; and (4) providing information and materials 
to the supervisory board. 
Arguably, the above lists are far from enough to cover all potential 
situations that fall within the category of the duty of loyalty or the duty of 
diligence. Especially, they fail to specify directors’ duty in compensation 
                                                                                                                           
 
169 Although the P.R.C. Company Law 2006 introduced duties of directors such as duty of loyalty 
and duty of diligence, they are statutory duties created by statutory law. They are not equivalent to the 
fiduciary duty in common law which are developed from the concept of fiduciary and trust. 
170 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, arts. 148 & 149. 
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negotiations. Although there are catch-all clauses in the PRC Company 
Law and the CSRC Guidelines, and they include other acts which violate 
the duty of loyalty or the duty of diligence,171 the above lists are too general 
to provide clear judicial guidance in proving breach of duties. In particular, 
since there are a large number of controlling shareholders in Chinese listed 
companies, detailed rules restraining controlling shareholders’ misconduct 
are crucial in protecting the minority shareholders. Moreover, there is no 
business judgment rule under Chinese law and the law is silent on the 
standards required for proving the breach of the duty of diligence and the 
duty of loyalty. Since Chinese courts lack authority to make or interpret law 
where no legislative statute exists,172 the statutory duties alone would not be 
effective in constraining directors’ misbehavior in negotiation of executive 
pay, or in creating incentives for directors to bargain actively with 
management over compensation issues. 
E. A Non-functioning Supervisory Board 
Like Germany and the Netherlands, China also has a two-tier board 
system, i.e. the board of directors and the supervisory board. However, the 
supervisory board has long been considered an ineffective mechanism for 
improving the independence and effectiveness of the board’s operations in 
China. In contrast to its German counterpart which governs the board of 
directors, a Chinese supervisory board has no authority to nominate, 
appoint or remove directors and has no decision-making powers in the 
operation of a company. Although supervisors are allowed to attend board 
meetings and make suggestions or enquiries to the board, they have no 
voting rights in board meetings. It only supervises the decision-making 
process of the board of directors,173 and monitors whether directors and 
managers violate laws or the articles of association. 
Moreover, unlike German supervisory boards which are appointed by 
and may be dismissed by the supervisors,174 Chinese supervisors are 
                                                                                                                           
 
171 CSRC Guidelines for Articles of Association of Listed Companies 2006, art. 98; P.R.C. 
Company Law 2006, art. 149. 
172 Statutes and written legal documents are the main sources of law in China. 
173 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, arts. 54–55. 
174 Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002). 
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appointed by and may be dismissed by the shareholders. Under PRC 
Company Law, the supervisory board must comprise at least three 
individuals, including representatives of shareholders and employees.175 
The representatives of employees must account for not less than one-third 
of the supervisors, but it is left for the articles of association to decide the 
exact number of representative employees.176 In concentrated shareholding 
context, it is common for controlling shareholders’ representatives to 
prevail in the supervisory board. Moreover, as the board decides employee 
compensation, it is questionable whether the supervisory board composing 
employee representatives would go against the board’s proposal on 
executive pay. Empirical evidence shows the supervisory boards only held 
an average of five meetings in 2011177 and most of the supervisory boards 
agreed to the board’s proposals.178 
In addition, under Dutch Corporate Governance Code, the supervisory 
board has the right to determine the remuneration of the individual 
members of the management boards, on a proposal made by the 
remuneration committee.179 The German legislature has recently considered 
that the remuneration of managing directors be reserved for the whole 
supervisory board,180 while the Chinese supervisory board does not have the 
authority to decide executive pay. 
F. The “Independent” Directors 
The independence of the board of directors and the supervisory board 
has long been a point of contention in Chinese corporate governance. The 
concept of independent directors was not formally introduced into China 
                                                                                                                           
 
175 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 118. 
176 Id. 
177 Performance of Directors, Supervisors and Senior Management in Companies Listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE (2011) [hereinafter SHANGHAI STOCK 
EXCHANGE], http://www.sse.com.cn/researchpublications/research/c/research20120810f.pdf, at 4. 
178 Id. at 4–6. 
179 Dutch Corporate Governance Code 2008, Principle of Determination and Disclosure of 
Remuneration & Best Practice provision 11.2.10. 
180 Davies & Hopt, supra note 123, at 311, 362. 
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until 2001.181 By law, the board of directors in listed companies must 
consist of at least one-third of independent directors.182 As a practical 
matter, independent directors are referred by controlling shareholders, 
directors and executives, nominated by the board, and approved by the 
shareholders’ general meetings. In companies with a concentrated 
shareholding structure, the controlling shareholders are able to exercise 
substantial influence over the board and dominate the shareholders’ general 
meeting; therefore, it is difficult for minority shareholders to have a say 
over the nomination of independent directors. In the realm of executive 
compensation, if independent directors challenge the executive 
compensation, they might face the risk of being expelled by the board. 
Empirical evidence from companies listed on the SSE also indicates that 
most independent directors agreed to the board proposals. Only 48 out of 
3,081 independent directors expressed objections to 36 board proposals183 
and only 4 objections were made to board proposals on the appointment of 
executives on average in 2011.184 
Moreover, many independent directors are not appointed on the basis 
of distinctive skills or interests, but are appointed to build up connections 
for listed companies and provide useful sources or add value to the 
companies.185 Empirical evidence proves most independent directors in 
Central SOEs are ex-government officials or ex-executives in other 
SOEs.186 Arguably, companies led by politically connected CEOs are more 
likely to appoint bureaucrats rather than professionals to the board,187 and 
these independent directors have a natural desire to avoid conflict within 
the board. 
                                                                                                                           
 
181 Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed 
Companies (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission, Aug. 16, 2001), available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/csrc_en/newsfacts/release/200708/t20070810_69191.htm (China). 
182 Id. at art. 1(3). 
183 SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 177, at 8–9. 
184 Id. at 8. 
185 See Jing Liao, Martin R. Young & Qian Sun, Independent Directors’ Characteristics and 
Performance: Evidence from China (Oct. 14, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1489088. 
186 Annual Reports Reveal that Most of the Independent Directors in Central SOEs are Ex-
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Governance, and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Newly Partially Privatized Firms, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 
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IV. THE WAY FORWARD FOR REGULATING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
The next question for examination is what legal strategies shall be 
made to address the concerns over executive pay. In particular, which 
techniques should be deployed to align the self-interest of executives with 
the interests of shareholders? As illustrated, the existing arrangement is 
such that executives, especially state-appointed executives in SOEs, are 
able to control the board and decide their own pay. Therefore, the major 
task of the regulator is to ensure that the design of the executive 
compensation is taken out of the hands of the board as a whole and lodged 
in the hands of the executives and shareholders as a class.188 
Efforts to regulate executive compensation have ranged widely, 
including, inter alia, implementing taxes, shareholder say-on-pay votes, 
judicial involvement, institutional shareholder activism, compensation 
disclosure and compensation recovery (“clawback”) policy.189 This section 
examines a few of the possible solutions and discusses whether they have 
been or will be effective in solving problems with executive pay in China. 
Some of the proposals made to the CSRC may also have potential value for 
other jurisdictions in regulating executive compensation. 
A. Heightened Disclosure 
Disclosure is frequently employed as a response to the growth of 
executive compensation. This mechanism enables company stakeholders to 
know and decide whether or not the compensation of executives is fair. The 
U.S. and the U.K. have well-established disclosure rules. The U.K. requires 
companies to release all details of executive remuneration in the annual 
accounts.190 The U.S. requires listed companies to disclose all 
compensation paid to the CEO, CFO and the next three highest paid 
executive officers.191 In recent years, the Securities and Exchange 
                                                                                                                           
 
188 PAUL DAVIES, INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY LAW 206 (2010). 
189 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
190 Companies Act, 2006, c. 6, part 15 (Eng.). 
191 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2013). 
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Commission (SEC) Proxy Statement Disclosure Rules have been enhanced 
several times to improve the disclosure mechanism.192 
Many scholars have argued that mere disclosure is not an effective 
remedy to mitigate executive compensation abuses.193 Especially, 
disclosure is a potential cause for rising CEO pay, as the pay itself serves as 
a signal affecting outsiders’ perceptions of a firm’s performance and 
value—the so-called “Lake Wobegon Effect.”194 Indeed, disclosure of 
existing compensation arrangements has been a double-edged sword. Many 
jurisdictions do not impose a stringent disclosure requirement on executive 
pay. For example, the European Community (EC) only requires annual 
disclosure of aggregate compensation to key management personnel.195 In 
Japan, executive compensation amounts were not disclosed publicly before 
2009.196 Individual compensation packages for executives receiving more 
than 100 million Japanese yen were not made public until 2010.197 
One might further argue that the prevalence of excessive executive 
compensation in the U.S. indicates that their stringent disclosure 
requirement does not work effectively to solve the problem. Indeed, there is 
no perfect regulation of executive pay and disclosure alone does not curb 
excessive pay. However, there is no doubt that heightened disclosure would 
increase transparency within the firm and enable stakeholders to be better 
informed of the pay issue. In the Chinese context, disclosure rules of listed 
companies are far from satisfactory as a remedy for compensation 
problems. 
                                                                                                                           
 
192 E.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 953–954, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
193 E.g., Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, CEO Pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect, 94 J. FIN. 
ECON. 280 (2009); Michael Faulkender & Jun Yang, Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? 
The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1786109 (suggesting that the SEC’s 2006 regulatory requirement of disclosing compensation 
peers did not mitigate firms’ opportunistic peer benchmarking of CEO compensation). 
194 Hayes & Schaefer, supra note 193, at 280–82; Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive 
Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487, 498 
(2013). 
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196 Hideaki Sakawa, Keisuke Moriyama & Naoki Watanabel, Relation Between Top Executive 
Compensation Structure and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Japanese Public Disclosed Data, 
20 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 593, 595 (2012). 
197 Id. at 593. 
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In China, only since 1999 had listed companies been required to 
disclose annual compensation and shareholdings of executives.198 PRC 
Company Law simply provides, “a joint-stock limited company shall 
disclose the remuneration of its directors, supervisors and executives on a 
regular basis.”199 The Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed 
Companies 2007 (the Disclosure Measure 2007) states that listed companies 
shall “disclose the appointment of directors, supervisors and senior 
managers, as well as their annual remuneration in annual reports.”200 A 
listed company must also disclose the implementation of the equity 
incentive plan in periodic reports.201 However, top executives’ pension 
schemes are not subject to disclosure, even though they constitute a 
significant part of their remuneration.202 It is suggested that the CSRC 
should mandate disclosure of the composition of individual executive pay, 
including their pension schemes. 
Moreover, there is no specific disclosure requirement on SOEs either. 
Central SOEs generally do not disclose executive compensation or on-duty 
consumption, while the primary income of senior executives is the on-duty 
consumption and grey income.203 The lack of transparency and external 
supervision of SOEs gives rise to corruption and inevitably undermines 
public confidence in these companies. The SASAC should improve public 
disclosure of SOEs, such as requiring detailed disclosure of individual 
executive pay, including on-duty consumption, pension schemes, etc. 
In addition, serious consideration should be given to the form of 
disclosure so as to ensure a clear and concise disclosure of executive pay. In 
                                                                                                                           
 
198 Notice of Improvement of the Quality of Financial Information in Listed Companies 
(promulgated by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Oct. 1, 1999) (China). 
199 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 117 (Article 72 of the P.R.C. Corporate Governance Code 
2002 also generally provides that the board of directors and the supervisory board shall disclose to the 
shareholders’ meeting on the compensation of directors and supervisors.). 
200 Regulations on Information Disclosure of Listed Companies (promulgated by China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Jan. 30, 2007), art. 21(5). 
201 Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Measures of 
Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies for Trial Implementation (promulgated 
by China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, Dec. 31, 2005), art. 42. 
202 See Liang Tong-ying, Feng Li & Chen Xiude, Pyramid Structure, Executive Perks and 
Corporate Value: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, NOV. J. SHANXI FIN. & ECON. 
U. 75, 76 (2012) (noting that on-duty consumption constitutes a significant part of the executive’s pay). 
203 Wang Shichuan, Call for Disclosure of Executive Pay in Central SOE, CHINA BUS. TIMES 
(Feb. 25, 2011), http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/14004711.html. 
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contrast to the SEC which requires compensation disclosure on the annual 
proxy statement, Chinese executive compensation is presented in scattered 
sections in annual reports.204 This creates enormous difficulty for the public 
to collect and understand compensation information. It is suggested that the 
CSRC may follow the SEC rules in requiring listed companies to present 
executive pay information in a simple and consolidated table, known as the 
“Summary Compensation Table,”205 in order to assist the public in 
understanding the disclosure in a clearer way. 
B. Strengthened Independence of Compensation Committees 
As observed by Professor Gordon, the better remedy in improving the 
corporate governance apparatus in the executive compensation area “is not 
a wholesale expansion of shareholder power, but a tailored series of 
measures designed to bolster the independence of the compensation 
committee.”206 
First, as discussed, a listed company is not obliged to have a 
compensation committee under Chinese law and it plays a limited role in 
the designing of executive arrangement.207 In order to prevent directors 
from interfering in the setting of executive pay, it is submitted that Chinese 
law should require all listed companies to set up compensation committees. 
The authority and duties of the compensation committee shall be clearly set 
out in the articles of association. In particular, the compensation committee 
shall have the authority to review, approve and revise the compensation 
proposals independently. Moreover, to minimize potential conflicts of 
interest, more stringent independence requirements should be imposed on 
the compensation committee. In particular, all members, including the 
chairman of the committee, must be independent directors. 
Second, in the U.S., listed companies must disclose the degree of the 
relationship between the company’s executive compensation practices and 
                                                                                                                           
 
204 This information is usually stated in the sections of “changes of shareholders and shareholder 
information,” “directors, supervisors and senior management,” “board report” and “financial statement 
annex” of annual reports. 
205 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(c) (2013). 
206 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The 
Case for “Compensation Discussion and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 676 (2005). 
207 See supra note 52. 
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corporate performance.208 Chinese listed companies are required to disclose 
this content but they are subject to less stringent disclosure requirements 
than their U.S. counterparts.209 Evidence also shows that a number of 
companies listed on SSE failed to disclose the procedures and operation of 
the compensation committees.210 
It is suggested that the CSRC mandate listed companies to disclose the 
composition, procedures and operation of the compensation committee, so 
as to strengthen the independence of the committee. CSRC may also 
consider following the SEC in requiring company executives to explain all 
material elements of the compensation of the executives under the 
“Compensation Discussion and Analysis” (CD&A),211 such as each element 
of compensation; why the company chooses to pay each element; how the 
registrant determines the amount for each element to pay; etc.212 
C. Say on Pay in China? 
To align the interest of shareholders with executives, almost all 
jurisdictions require some form of shareholder vote on executive 
compensation. In 2002, a new section, 241A, was inserted into the U.K. 
Companies Act, which gave members the right to an advisory vote on the 
directors’ remuneration report (the so-called “say on pay”).213 The U.K. 
Companies Act also requires shareholder approval for payments to dismiss 
directors by way of compensation for loss of office.214 Recently, proposals 
have been made by the British government for a three-yearly binding vote 
                                                                                                                           
 
208 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 953–
954, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
209 See Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Standards 
Concerning the Contents and Formats of Information Disclosure by Companies Offering Securities to 
the Public No. 2—Contents and Formats of Annual Reports (2012 revision) (promulgated by China Sec. 
Regulatory Comm’n, Sept. 19, 2012), art. 41(3). 
210 Minghui, supra note 160. 
211 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) (2013). 
212 Id. 
213 U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILL, SHAREHOLDER VOTES ON EXECUTIVE 
REMUNERATION, IMPACT ASSESSMENT BIS/12/648, at 27 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31374/12-648-shareholder-votes-executive-
remuneration-impact-assessment.pdf. 
214 U.K. Companies Act, 2006 ch. 46, §§ 215–26 (Eng.). 
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on pay policy.215 In the U.S., the say on pay mechanism became effective in 
2011 under the far-reaching Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).216 It requires companies to conduct a 
shareholder advisory vote on specified executive compensation not less 
than once every three years.217 At least once every six years, shareholders 
must vote on how frequently to hold such an advisory vote.218 More 
recently, countries such as Germany, Italy, and Sweden have followed the 
U.K. and given the general assembly a say on pay, but this is consultative 
and relates merely to the remuneration system and structures.219 
In China, shareholders also have votes to approve general 
remuneration220 and stock option plans.221 However, they have no right to 
design or propose executive pay and their approval right is not detrimental 
to the board proposals on executive pay. One might argue that shareholders’ 
advisory votes would give the board certain pressure and make them more 
prudent in setting executive pay. Nevertheless, it does not seem imperative 
or feasible to adopt the shareholders say on pay vote in the Chinese context. 
First of all, the say on pay mechanism was introduced by the U.K. 
which features a dispersed shareholding structure. However, as noted, the 
shareholding structure is much more concentrated in Chinese listed 
companies than their British counterparts.222 Thus, it is unlikely that 
minority shareholders in Chinese listed companies would defeat the board 
proposal. 
Second, in contrast to the U.K. where institutional shareholders have 
long exercised influence over corporate governance rule-making,223 Chinese 
                                                                                                                           
 
215 Davies & Hopt, supra note 123, at 362. 
216 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 122; Martin J. Conyon, Executive Compensation 
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217 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012). 
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219 Davies & Hopt, supra note 123, at 362–63. 
220 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, art. 38(2). 
221 Notice of the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Promulgating the Measures for the 
Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial Implementation) (promulgated 
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2005, No. 151, art. 12. 
222 See supra text accompanying notes 113–23. 
223 Davies & Hopt, supra note 123, at 368. See also Gordon, supra note 206, at 701 (noting that 
institutional investors in the U.S. have great capacity and long experience in acting collectively in 
corporate law issues). 
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institutional shareholders play a negative role in improving corporate 
governance and they do not develop the expertise to engage in this activity. 
Due to policy constraints, institutional investors were not permitted to make 
equity investment until the 1990s. Only during the early 2000s did 
insurance companies, social security funds and corporate pension funds 
begin to engage in securities investment.224 In 2002, the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII)—a program allowing licensed foreign 
investors to buy and sell A-shares in China’s stock exchanges was 
launched. The pilot scheme for the Renminbi Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (RQFII)225 was introduced in 2010 and was revised 
in 2013.226 As at the end of 2008, the institutional investor ownership 
(including securities investment funds, National Social Security Fund, 
QFII, Insurance companies, enterprise pension funds, securities companies 
and other institutions) accounted for 54.62% of the A-share equity in listed 
companies.227 However, as the ownership of securities investment funds 
managed by a single fund manager is capped at 10% in a listed company,228 
their ownership in a particular company is small. Empirical evidence also 
proves that the average ownership concentration ratio of the first largest 
institutional investors was relatively low.229 Arguably, the low level of 
ownership concentration of institutional investors creates difficulties for 
institutional investors to “act in concert” and to defeat board proposals on 
executive pay. Also, the small size of their ownership stakes provides no 
                                                                                                                           
 
224 For example, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) started to make securities investments 
in 2003. 
225 The pilot scheme of RQFII was originally limited to Hong Kong subsidiaries of PRC 
incorporated fund management companies and securities companies which have obtained a type of 
license from the Hong Kong regulator. 
226 Under the revised RQFII scheme, qualified Hong Kong subsidiaries of PRC incorporated 
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futures to hedge its holding of A-shares. 
227 Ye Jing, Institutional Investors Account For More Than Fifty Percent of A-Shares Equity, 
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228 Administrative Measures for the Operation of Public Securities Investment Funds 
(promulgated by the China Sec. Regulatory Comm’n, 2013), art. 32 (China). 
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Governance?, 9 DIRECTORS & BOARDS 100 (2010). 
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incentive for institutional investors to monitor the designing of 
compensation arrangement closely. 
Third, the effectiveness of say on pay is highly contested.230 It has 
been accused of doing little to slow the growth of executive pay.231 Even in 
the U.K. where the say on pay mechanism was introduced, executive 
compensation has continued to rise significantly since the introduction of 
the mechanism.232 Additionally, there are substantial legislative and 
economic costs for the adoption of the say on pay mechanism and it is 
uncertain whether the benefits would outweigh the costs involved. 
There are alternatives to improve the shareholder vote on executive 
compensation. For example, regulators may consider requiring companies 
to disclose the shareholder voting according to the types of shareholders 
(e.g., controlling shareholders, institutional investors and minority 
shareholders). This may give shareholders greater legitimacy to inquire 
about executive compensation. Under the U.S. Securities Exchange Act, 
institutional investment managers shall report at least annually how it voted 
on any shareholder vote, including those of executive compensation.233 
China may also consider requiring controlling shareholders or large 
shareholders to disclose how they vote on executive pay, in order to prevent 
them from covering up the grievances of minority shareholders. 
D. Compensation Consultants? 
In the U.S., a compensation committee customarily retains an expert 
executive compensation consultant to advise on executive pay.234 Under the 
                                                                                                                           
 
230 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 122–27. 
231 Thomas & Wells, supra note 7, at 847. 
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234 Conyon, supra note 216, at 401. However, it must be noted that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act does not require that a compensation committee engage any 
consultant or other advisors. It only requires that, before selecting a compensation consultant, a 
compensation committee must take into factors specified in the Act and other factors determined 
appropriate by the SEC. 
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U.K. Corporate Governance Code, the remuneration committee should be 
responsible for appointing consultants in respect of executive director 
remuneration.235 By contrast, Chinese listed companies are not obliged to 
appoint compensation consultants.236 CSRC Measures generally state that 
listed companies may employ financial advisers to advise on the equity 
incentive schemes when necessary.237 When is it necessary to encourage 
compensation committees to retain an expert compensation consultant? 
Since directors in the compensation committee are accused of being too 
close to executives, would the use of external advice from acknowledged 
experts help to confer legitimacy on the committee’s decisions? 
The effectiveness of executive pay consultants is controversial. On the 
one hand, compensation consultants provide valuable data, information, and 
professional expertise to client firms.238 They help the board and the 
compensation committee to understand the value of complex pay packages 
and associated tax, disclosure, and accounting issues.239 In economics, a 
firm can design an optimal compensation contract at a lower cost with the 
help of compensation consultants, rather than devising the pay plan itself.240 
Meanwhile, by helping to design an optimal compensation package, 
compensation consultants would better align the interests of executives and 
firms, and thus lower agency costs.241 Empirical evidence also proves 
positive correlation between CEO pay and the presence of compensation 
consultants.242 On the other hand, opponents contend that consultants are 
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not sufficiently independent or impartial, and would contribute to excessive 
compensation.243 Even if they are truly independent, there are practical 
concerns on who has the capacity to serve in this position and who will be 
willing to serve in this position. 
It is hard to predict the effects of compensation consultants in the 
Chinese context. Firstly, due to the short history of the Chinese capital 
market, the sector of compensation consultant is still emerging. 
Presumably, there is a shortage of qualified individual experts who are able 
to provide valuable expertise and information on executive pay. Secondly, 
as the independence of independent director is questionable at the current 
stage, it would be equally challenging to ensure the independence of the 
compensation consultant. In particular, conflicts of interest would arise 
when the consultant who assists a company in determining executive pay 
also provides additional (non-executive compensation-related) services to 
the company. Thirdly, the role of consultants is supplementary. Ultimately, 
it depends primarily on the board and the compensation committee to fix 
the problems of executive compensation. 
Nonetheless, one can speculate that the subject and the role of 
compensation consultants will receive more attention in the near future. 
With increasing public and shareholder concerns on executive pay, the 
compensation committee may be required to be more conversant in 
designing compensation arrangements. Particularly, listed companies, 
especially the state-controlled listed companies, may tend to move toward 
engaging professional consultants as a way of educating the compensation 
committee, so as to improve the fairness and transparency in the designing 
of executive pay. 
Additionally, to avoid conflict of interest of compensation consultants, 
the U.S. Securities Exchange Act requires companies to disclose whether 
“the work of the compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest 
and, if so, the nature of the conflict and how the conflict is being 
addressed.”244 The U.K. Corporate Governance Code also provides “where 
remuneration consultants are appointed, they should be identified in the 
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annual report and a statement made as to whether they have any other 
connection with the company.”245 It is suggested that mandatory disclosure 
requirements should also be imposed on the compensation consultant and 
Chinese listed companies should disclose any potential conflict of interest 
with regards to their compensation consultations. 
E. Court’s Role in Executive Pay 
American courts, including Delaware courts, have been monitoring 
executive compensation in public companies since the 1930s,246 though the 
desire of courts to subject executive pay to scrutiny and the role of courts in 
reviewing executive compensation practices have been evolving.247 
Recently, Delaware courts have taken a more proactive role in monitoring 
executive compensation by scrutinizing rigorously officers’ actions in 
negotiating their own compensation agreements. The Delaware Chancery 
Court has recently held that corporate officers are bound by their duty of 
loyalty to negotiate employment contracts in an arm’s-length and 
adversarial manner.248 In Germany, there is a more aggressive judicial 
approach towards executive compensation.249 
In the Chinese context, although the P.R.C. Company Law provides 
legal basis for shareholders to bring a derivative action against directors,250 
there is no derivative suit against directors regarding excessive executive 
compensation since the derivative action was adopted in China in 2006.251 
Moreover, there is no specific judicial interpretation of the statutory duty of 
                                                                                                                           
 
245 THE FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE § D.2.1 (2012) 
(U.K.), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-
Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.pdf. 
246 See Harwell Wells, No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year: The Fight over Executive 
Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 717–27 (2010); Thomas & Wells, supra note 
7. 
247 Thomas & Wells, supra note 7, at 865–66 (discussing the history of executive compensation in 
American courts). 
248 Id. at 849. 
249 KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 76–77, 165. 
250 P.R.C. Company Law 2006, arts. 150 & 152. 
251 The author conducted a search on the widely-used electronic database of Chinese law, Bei Da 
Fa Bao (Law Info China), Law Info China, http:// www.lawinfochina.com. However, as of the date of 
this article, no case was found on derivative action against directors on excessive executive 
compensation. 
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loyalty and duty of diligence.252 Given the lack of a doctrine of precedents 
and clear judicial guideline in interpreting directors’ duties in designing 
executive pay, it is difficult for judges to decide on executive matter. 
Further, there is no business judgment rule in China, creating greater 
difficulties for courts to exonerate the board from civil liability in setting 
executive pay. To enhance the role of courts in executive compensation, 
legislature may consider specifying the duty of the board and the 
compensation committee in setting executive pay. For example, both the 
board and the compensation committee must exercise due diligence in 
preparing and approving executive pay packages and policies. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The article offers a critical assessment of the special regulatory 
framework that leads to the current state of executive pay practices in 
China. It reveals that the various governance institutions do not function 
effectively in administering a fair and transparent procedure for executive 
compensation. These factors include the lack of mandatory requirement of 
the compensation committee, ineffective monitoring by independent 
directors and the supervisory board, as well as a less stringent disclosure 
requirement for listed companies and SOEs. The government’s 
administrative influences over executive pay and the political-linked 
appointment of executives in SOEs also lead to a less optimal design of 
executive compensation. 
It concludes that the primary role of Chinese law should not simply be 
to curb excessive pay, but it should be to improve the regulatory structure 
for setting executive compensation in a more transparent and effective way. 
In particular, regulators should ensure that the designing of executive 
compensation is taken out of the hands of the board. To achieve this, further 
legal strategies and techniques must be deployed, including heightening 
disclosure, strengthening the independence of the board and the 
compensation committee, imposing mandatory requirements on listed 
companies to set up compensation committees, and granting the 
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compensation committee the authority to set executive compensation (not 
simply make recommendations to the board). 
It is suggested that listed companies should optimize the ownership 
structure and corporate governance, as a fundamental solution to the 
compensation problem. Serious consideration should be given to reduce 
state equity and political influence in SOEs and ensure transparent and fair 
appointment of executives. In addition, regulators should consider how to 
utilize the taxation regime to incentivize executive compensation, as well as 
how to encourage institutional investors to play a proactive role in the 
setting of executive compensation. 
